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A b stract
In labor m arket models as well as in exchange economies w ith indivisible goods 
gross substitutability is used as a  property to  guarantee the  existence of com­
petitive equilibria. In abstracto th is property can be considered as a property 
of TU-games. This paper develops an easy way to  check gross substitu tabil­
ity for general TU-games. Concavity is one of the conditions th a t has to  be 
satisfied. Only one other type of relation m ust be checked to  guarantee gross 
substitutability.
1 Introduction
In Kelso and Crawford (1982) a model of a labor market is described. There is a set 
of firms and a set of workers W . A firm can hire a team  of workers S  C W  and the 
profitability (utility) of such an action is given by: 
u (S ,p ): =  v(S) — 5 > .
*€S
The number denotes the salary demand of worker i and v(S)  is the profit the 
firm gets from the job done (here, the characteristic function v depends on the firm). 
Given a fixed salary (price) vector p, a firm maximizes its utility by hiring a team of 
employees S  for which v(S) — Y^izsP i maximal-
We denote the collection of teams S  C W  th a t maximizes the utility by B(p) and the 
union of these teams by c(p).
The paper introduces the following condition on the functions v:
The pair (W ,v) satisfies gross substitutability (the GS-property) if for every salary- 
level p  G H 14, for every worker i G c(p) and for every alternative salary level q >  p  
with qt = pi, the player is still ‘in demand’ i.e. i G c(q).
In words: if hiring a team  S  with i G S  is an optimal action for some firm at salary level 
p, and the salary levels of some workers increase, but the one of worker i remains the 
same, then hiring a (perhaps different) team  T  containing i is still an optimal action 
for this firm.
It can be proved th a t if all characteristic functions satisfy gross substitutability, a 
salary level can be found th a t “clears the labor m arket” .
In an other paper (Beviá, Quinzii and Silva (1997)) an exchange economy with in­
divisible goods and money is considered. Let Q be the set of indivisible goods (it 
will play the role of W  in the previous example). The preference of an agent in the 
exchange economy is of the form:
1
u ( B ,m ): =  v(B)  + m,  
in which B  C Q is any consumption bundle of indivisible goods and m  is an amount of 
money. The function v depends on the agent. As the paper assumes th a t the money 
supply is abundant, the agent is able to  purchase every bundle of goods B  C Q and 
he is willing to  do so at price level p  € IRP if B  maximizes v(B) — ^ p¡. In this 
model the GS-property reads like: *gb
If a good i is in demand by some agent at price level p, i.e. there is a bundle B  
containing i th a t maximizes the agents utility at price level p, then the good is still 
demanded when the price level rises but the price of good i remains the same.
In both examples gross substitutability can be understood as a property of a TU­
game. At the end of the manuscript Bevia et al. raised the following problem:
“It would be interesting to  characterize all reservation functions which lead to  de­
mands satisfying Gross Substitutability, in order to  find which interpretable restric­
tions on the preferences of the agents are compatible with GS.”
This is exactly what we do in this paper.
The following example shows a typical situation in which the GS-property is violated. 
We use the terminology of Kelso and Crawford.
Suppose that, a t some salary level p, it is only optimal for a firm to hire the team 
S  U (i j ) or the team S  U (k ). For instance when the skills of i, j  and k are more or 
less the same but workers i and j  want a part-tim e job and worker k wants a full-time 
job. When worker j  raises his salary demand (e.g. because he got an offer from an 
outsider), the firm is no longer indifferent between hiring SU (ij) and S u ( k )  and will 
hire S  U (k ). Gross substitutability is violated, as worker i is no longer in demand, 
while his salary claim is the same as before.
The example shows that, if the GS-property holds, there cannot be a salary level p  
such th a t B(p) = {£> U (i j ) , S  U (k )} for three different players i , j , k  not in S.  By an 
analogous example one can show th a t also B(p) = {£> U (ij),  £>} is not possible under 
the GS-property. This paper proves the more striking converse of these statements: 
If a TU-game does not satisfy the GS-property, then there is a price level p  such tha t 
B(p) = {S  U (ij),  S } or B(p) = {S  U (ij),  S  U (*)}•
We show th a t the existence of a price level p  with B(p) = {£> U (ij),  £>} corresponds 
to  the non-concavity condition:
v(S  U (ij)) — v(S  U (i)) — v(S  U (j)) + v(S) > 0 
and th a t B(p) = {£> U ( i j ) , S  U (k)} corresponds to  the situation that:
v(S  U (ij)) + « (S U  (k)) > max{w(Sl U (i k )) + « (S U  ( j ) ) , v(S  U (jk)) + v(S  U (*))}.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives the necessary preliminaries. 
Section 3 shows th a t concavity of a TU-game is implied by the GS-property. Section 4 
deals with the converse statem ent mentioned above. This enables us to  give a method 
to  check the GS-property in section 5. It has a complexity of 0 ( K  log3(K)) ,  in which 
K  is the size of the input, i.e. the number of coalitions of the game (N,v) .  We 
conclude with two features of the collection of games with the GS-property (section 
6).
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2 Prelim inaries
A Transferable Utility game or TU-game is a pair (N, v) in which N  is a finite set (of 
players) and v: 2N IR is a map, called the characteristic function of the TU-game. 
It is assumed th a t v(<j>) = 0. In the papers mentioned in the introduction, (W,v)  and 
(Q,v)  are examples of TU-games.
For a price vector p  G !R% and a coalition S  C N  we denote ^2i€SPi by p(S).
The excess of a coalition S  with respect to  a price vector p  equals v(S) — p(S).  For 
a price vector p  we denote the collection of coalitions with highest excess by B(p).  
For any collection of coalitions B,  not necessarily corresponding to  a price vector, the 
coalition c(B) contains the players th a t are a member of at least one element of B. 
Similarly, d(B) contains the players th a t are in all coalitions in B.  The notations c(p) 
and d(p) are abbreviations of c(B(pj) and d(B(pj) respectively.
The following concept is the key concept of this paper.
D e fin itio n  1: A TU-game (N, v)  satisfies the gross substitutability property (GS- 
property) i f  for every price vector p  G !R% and every player i G c(p), also i G c(q) 
holds, i f  q > p  with qt = p t .
In the characterization of TU-games with the GS-property we need a property for 
collections of coalitions. For such a collection B and a player i G N  we define:
B -i = {S  G B : i $ S}  and =  {T  G B : i G T}.
D e fin itio n  2: A collection o f coalitions B demonstrates violation o f the GS-property 
(has property (DV)) i f  there is a player i G c(B) and a coalition S  G B -i such that, 
for all T (r B,. we have T  % S  U (i).
Note th a t (DV) is a technical property on collections of coalitions (in N).  It does 
not depend on the characteristic function v. Proposition 3 proves th a t “the existence 
of a price vector p  such th a t B(p) has property (DV)” is truly a signal th a t the GS- 
property is violated. Typical examples of collections B (of size two) satisfying (DV) 
are:
B = { S U ( i j ) , S }  and B = {S  U (ij),  S  U (jfc)}.
Here S' is a coalition in N  and i, j  (and k) are different players outside S. More 
general, for collections B = {S ',!1} the property (DV) holds if and only if:
m a x { |S \T |, |T \S |} > 2 . (1)
The following proposition characterizes games with the GS-property by the collections 
B(p) th a t occur.
P ro p o s i tio n  3: For every TU-game (N, v) exactly one o f the following alternatives 
holds:
(i) (N, v)  has the GS-property,
(ii) there is a price vector p  G !RN such that B(p) has property (DV).
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Proof: Suppose th a t B(p) has property (DV). Let i G c(p) and S  G B(p) - i  have the 
required property. If we define qu := pu + 1 for k $  S  U (i) and qe =  pt  for I G S U (i), 
the coalition S keeps the highest excess but all coalitions with at least one player 
outside S U (i) are not elements of B(q).  In particular, all coalitions T  G B(p)i  are 
no longer in B(q) because of (DV). Then i  ^ c(q) and (N,v)  does not satisfy the 
GS-property.
Conversely, suppose th a t no collection B(p) has property (DV). Let p  be any price 
vector, let i be a player in c(p) and let q > p  with qt = p t . Because locally the collection 
of coalitions with highest excess can only decrease, there is an open neighborhood V  
of p  such th a t if q G V,  then B(q) C B(p).  For the moment we assume th a t q G V.  
Let S G B(q).  If i G S we have i G c(q). If i S,  let T  G B(p)i  be a coalition with 
T C S U  (i). Such a coalition exists because B(p) does not have property (DV). Then 
also T  G B(q) as the price of T  increases less than the price of S. Also in this case 
we find i G c(q). So, for every price vector p  G !RN there is a neighborhood V  such 
th a t for alternative price vectors q G V  with q > p  and g, =  p, the condition of the 
GS-property is satisfied. Take now q > p  with qt = p t arbitrarily.
The set of numbers t  G [0,1] such th a t i G c(qt) for qt := p +  t(q — p) is open (by the 
previous argument) and closed. It contains 0 and, therefore, 1 too. <
C o ro lla ry  4: I f  (N, v)  has the GS-property, then no collection B(p) is a collection 
o f one o f the following types: 
type 1 : {S, U (ij) ,S 1} 
type 2 : {S  U (ij),  S  U (k)}.
Section 4 proves the converse of this corollary:
I f  (N,  v) does not have the GS-property, then there is a price vector p  such that B(p) 
is a collection o f type 1 or type 2.
3 Gross substitutability implies concavity
A TU-game (N, v) is called concave if v(S) + v(T)  > v(S  U T)  + v(S  n  T)  whenever
S, T  C N.  An equivalent condition is: v(S  U (*)) +  v(S  U (j)) > v(S  U (ij)) +  v(S)  
whenever S  C N \ ( i j )  and i ^  j .
In order to  prove the statem ent in the title of this section we show th a t the existence 
of a price level p  with B(p) = {Sl ) ( i j ) ,  S'} corresponds to  the non-concavity condition: 
v(S  U (ij)) — v(S  U (*)) — v(S  U (j)) + v(S) > 0.
P ro p o s i tio n  5: Let  (N, v)  be a TU-game, let i and j  be different players in N  and 
let S  C N\ ( i j ) .  The following statements are equivalent:
(i) there is a price vector p  with B(p) =  {S U (ij),  S},
(ii) v(S  U (ij)) + v(S) > v(S  U (*)) +  v(S  U (j)).
Proof: If condition (i) holds, take such a vector p  and the addition of: 
v(S  U (ij)) — p(S  U (ij)) > v(S  U (*)) — p(S  U (*)) and 
v ( S ) - p ( S )  > v ( S U (j)) - p ( S U  (j))
generates the non-concavity condition (ii).
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If condition (ii) holds, let p,: =  v(S  U (ij) — v(S)  + 6 and py.=  v(S  U (jj) — v(S) + 6 
such th a t Pi + pj  = v(S  U (ij)) — v(S).  Then 6 is strictly positive by condition (ii). 
The prices in S  are taken quite low and the prices outside S  U (ij) are taken quite 
high, i.e. take a large number K  and define pu'-= —K  for k G S  and p f.=  K  for 
I  S  U (ij).  Then coalitions with maximal excess contain S  and are contained in 
S  U (ij).  It is easy to verify th a t the excesses of S  and S  U (ij) are both equal to 
v(S)  + K \S \ and the excesses of S  U (i) and S  U (j) are both equal to  v(S) + K IS] — 5. 
Hence, B(p) =  {S U (ij),  S}.  <
Proposition 5 makes the following theorem easy to  prove:
T heorem  6: TU-games satisfying gross substitutability are concave.
Proof: If (N, v)  satisfies the GS-condition, there is no price p  such th a t B(p) has 
type 1. So, by proposition 5 no non-concavity condition of the form v(SU( i j j )+v(S)  > 
v(S  U (ij) + v(S  U (j j) is valid and the game is concave. <
P rop osition  7: I f  (N, v)  satisfies concavity, and S  and T  are elements o f B(p) for 
some vector p  € ! R \  then U G B(p) for all U with S  C U C T.
Proof: By concavity we have: v(U) + v( (T\U)  U S) > v(S)  + v(T).  Hence, if S  and 
T  have maximal excess, U and (T\U)  U S  have maximal excess as well. <
4 Characterization of games satisfying the GS-property
This section proves the key theorem of the paper:
T heorem  8: A TU-game (N, v) has the GS-property i f  and only i f  none o f the 
collections B(p) is a collection o f type 1 or type 2.
Proof: Corollary 4 proves the ‘only if’-part of the theorem already. If the ‘if’-part were 
false, by proposition 5 and theorem 6 there must exist concave TU-games violating 
the GS-property, such th a t B(p) is never a collection of type 2. Let us assume tha t 
(N, v)  is such a game with a minimal number of players n, where n := |iV|.
The proof consists of three steps. The first two steps prove th a t there is a price vector 
p  with B(p) = { S , N \ S } .
Step 1. For every p  G !R% such that B(p) has property (DV), c(p) = N  and d(p) = <j>.
Let p  G !R \ Suppose, on the contrary, th a t B(p) has property (DV), but c(p) ^  N  
or d(p) ^  (j>. Define the concave TU-game (N , v) by:
N :=  c(p)\d(p) and v(T): = v ( T  U d(pj) -  v(d(pj) for T  C N.
Clearly \N\ < |iV|. Let p: = /)N . Then for all S, T  C N:
v ( S ) —p(S) > v ( T ) —p(T) v(SUd(pj )—p(SUd(pj) > v(T\Jd(pj)—p(T\Jd(pj).  
Since all coalitions in B(p) contain d(p),  we have: S  G B(p) S  U d(p) G B(p).
Hence, B(p) = {S\d(p)  : S  G B (p j\.
Furthermore, B(p) has property (DV) because B(p) has property (DV). If, namely, 
i G c(p) and S  G B(p) - i  show (DV) in B(p),  then i G c(p) and S\d(p)  G B(p) - i  show 
(DV) in B(p).  Hence, (N, v)  is a concave game without the GS-property.
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Because n  has been chosen minimal, there is a price vector q G !R% such th a t B(q) 
is a collection of type 2. Extend q to  q by qu := —K  if k G d(p) and qe := K  if 
I  $ c(p). If K  has been chosen sufficiently large, all coalitions in B(q)  contain d(p) 
and are contained in c(p). In fact, B(q)  equals { T  U d(p) : T  G B(q)}.  Then B(q) is 
also of type 2. This was supposed to  be false: c(p) = N  and d(p) = <j>.
Step 2. There is a price vector p  such that B(p) has property  (DV) and has size two. 
By proposition 3 there are price vectors q such th a t B(q)  has property (DV). Let p  
be one of them such th a t the size of B(p) is minimal among the collections B(q)  with 
property (DV).
Take a player i G c(p) = N  and a coalition S  G B(p) - i  such that, for all T  G B(p)i,  
we have T  S  U (i). If we choose T  G B(p)i  arbitrarily, the collection {S, T}  also has 
property (DV). If we prove th a t B(p) = {S', T} ,  we are done. Note th a t T  ^  (i).
First we prove th a t {S, T }  is a partition of N.  Suppose this is not the case. Let q be 
the price vector obtained from p  by increasing the prices outside S U T  and decreasing 
the prices inside S n  T  with the amount e > 0. Take e so small th a t B(q)  C B(p).  
Coalitions U G B(p) with S n T ^ U  or U ^ S l i T  drop out. The coalitions S 
and T,  however, survive. Then \B(q)\ < \B(p)\ and we are done if also B(q)  has 
property (DV). The collection B(q)  has the property (DV) because S G B(q) - i  and 
no V  G B(p)i  is a part of SU (i). This is certainly true for V  G B(q)i,  as it is a subset 
of B(p)i . So T  = N \ S .  Because (i) £  T,  we have \T\ > 2.
As T  G B(p)i  was chosen arbitrarily, an other choice T* must also be the complement 
of S, i.e. there is no other choice and B(p)i  = {T}.
If S* G B(p) - i  and S* ^  S, we must have T  C S* U (i), otherwise {S*,T} is also a 
partition and S* =  S. If we take a new price vector q obtained from p  by decreasing 
the price p, with e and increasing the prices in T\ ( i )  with |T \(* )|-1e (this is possible 
because T  ^  (i)!), the excesses of S and T  remain the same and the excess of S* 
decreases. If e has been chosen sufficiently small, the collection B(q)  is of smaller size 
than B(p),  and has property (DV). This is not possible because the size of B(p) has 
been chosen minimal, which proves step 2.
Combining steps 1 and 2, we find a price vector p  with B(p) = { S , N \ S }  for some 
coalition S C N.  Moreover, B(p) has property (DV). Observe th a t B(p) cannot be 
{<j>,N} because of proposition 7.
Step 3. There is a price vector r such that:
B(r) has property (DV) and
c(r) ^  N  or B(r) is a collection o f type 2.
First we handle low values of n. If n = 2, B(p) must be {(*), (j)},  but this partition 
does not have property (DV). Therefore, n  is a t least equal to  3.
For n = 3, B(p) must be of the form {(i j),  (k)},  i.e. B(p) is of type 2. Hence, we can 
take r  equal to  p.
For n = 4, the partition {(i j),  (ki)} will require a special treatm ent.
So, for the time being we will assume th a t n > 4, th a t 1 < |Ar\S | < \S\ and \S\ > 3. 
Take j  G T  := N \ S ,  k G S and increase pj  and pu with the same amount till the 
collection of coalitions with maximal excess changes. We get a price vector q with 
B(q) = {S, T,  W u  . . . ,  W„} with W m C N \ ( j k )  for m  = 1 ,2 , . . . ,  s.
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Case 1. There is a coalition W  = W m ^  N \ ( j k ) .
Then there is a player £ ^ W m U (jk).  Suppose th a t £ £ T  (the other choice leads 
to  the same argument). If we increase pu slightly, we get a new price vector r  with 
B(r) = B(q) \ {S} .  Then B(r)  has property (DV) by W  £ B(r )__,-, B(r),  = {T} and 
T  % W  U (j) (since £ £ T \ W ) .  Then k $ c(r), so c(r) ^  N.
Case 2. B(q) = { S , T , N \ ( j k ) } .
Increase the price of k slightly and get a new price vector r  with B(r) = {T,  N \ ( j k ) } .  
Then c(r) ^  N  since k T  and B(r)  has property (DV) because N \ ( j k ) contains at 
least two players not in T  (by (N \ ( j k ) ) \ T  = (N \ ( j k )) f lS  =  S\ ( k )  and \S\ > 3), 
hence formula (1) in the introduction can be applied.
So, we are left with the case n = 4 and B(p) = {(i j),  (k£)}. Increase all prices with 
the same amount till the collection of coalitions with maximal excess changes. We 
get B(q) = B(p) U { W \ , . . .  , W S}.  Then \Wm \ < 1 for all m  < s and, by proposition 
7, one of the new coalitions is a singleton. Suppose W i = (i). We will change q into 
r  in such a way th a t B(r) = {(*), (k£)}. This happens if r t = qt — 2 . rj = qj + e, 
rk = and r.( = qi — e. The prices of (i) and (k£) decrease with 2e and the prices
of other coalitions in B(q) decrease less. Take, once again, e > 0 sufficiently small to 
ensure th a t B(r)  C B(q).  Then B(r)  is of type 2. This proves the statem ent of step 3.
By assumption, there is no price vector r  with B(r)  of type 2. Hence, the statements 
of steps 1 and 3 are contradicting. This finishes the proof of theorem 8. <
5 Checking gross substitutability
The following theorem shows th a t checking whether a TU-game has the GS-property 
concerns two types of inequalities. In the formulation of the theorem, i , j , k  are 
different players, not in S.
T h e o re m  9: Let  (N, v)  be a TU-game. The following statements are equivalent:
(i)-a there is a price vector p  with B(p) =  {S' U (ij),  S'} for some S, i, j ,
(ii)-a v (S  U (ij)) +  v(S) > v(S  U (*)) +  v(S  U (j)) for some S , i , j ,
(iii)-a the game (N, v) is not concave.
I f  the game (N , v) is concave, the following statements are equivalent:
(i)-b there is a price vector p  with B(p) =  {S U (ij),  S  U (k)} for some S, i , j ,  k,
(ii)-b w(SU(ij))+w(SU(fc)) > max{w(SU(ifc))+w(SU(j)), w(SU(jfc))+w(SU(i))} 
for some S , i , j ,  k,
(iii)-b the game (N, v) does not have the GS-property
Proof: The a-part of the theorem holds by proposition 5 and the definition of con­
cavity. So, assume th a t (N, v) is a concave game. The equivalence of (i)-b and (iii)-b 
follows by proposition 5 and theorem 8.
If (i)-b holds, we have the inequalities:
v(S  U (ij)) — p(S  U (ij)) > v(S  U (ik)) — p(S  U (ik)) and 
v ( S  U (k)) -  p(S  U (k)) > v ( S  U (j)) -  p(S  U (j)),  
which sum up to:
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v(S  U (ij)) + v(S  U (kj) > v(S  U (i k )) +  v(S  U (j)).
The other inequality follows by interchanging the roles of i and j.
If (ii)-b is given, we have to  find a price vector p  such th a t B(p) = {£> U (ij),  S  U (k )}. 
As in the proof of proposition 5, take the prices in S  quite low: pu := —K  for k € S,  
and outside S  U (i j k ) quite high: pi  := K  if £ ^ S  U (i j k ). Take K  so large th a t only 
the coalitions T  with S  C T  C S  U (i jk)  can have the highest excess. Only the prices 
for i, j  and k still have to  be defined.
Let (( i jk) ,w)  be the 3-person game defined by: w(T): = v ( S u T )  —v(S)  for T  C (ijk).  
We are left with the problem to find a vector (pt ,pj ,pk)  such th a t w(i j )  — p(i j )  = 
w(k) —p(k) > w(T) —p ( T ) for all T  ^ {(ij),  (k)}.  By concavity of ((ijk),  w),  we have: 
w(i j )  = w(i) + w(j )  — a with a >  0.
Statement (ii)-b gives:
w(ik) — w(i) — w(k) = w(i j )  — w(i) — w(j )  — b with b > 0 and 
w(jk)  — w(j )  — w(k) = w(i j )  — w(i) — w(j )  — c with c > 0.
W ithout loss of generality we assume th a t c > b. Define p, := w(i) — a — 0.5b, 
Pj := w(j )  — a — 0.5b and pu := w(k) — a — b. Then the coalitions (ij) and (k) have 
excess a+b  (with respect to  w) and the coalitions (i), (j) and (ik) have excess a+0.5b. 
The excess of (jk) is a + 1.5b — c < a + 0.5b. Finally, to  compute the excess of (i jk),  
take the concavity condition:
w(i jk)  + w(k) < w(ik) + w(jk) ,  
subtract p, +  pj + 2pu:
w(i jk)  - p( i j k)  + (a+ b) < (a + 0.56) +  (a +  1.56 — c).
Therefore, w(i jk)  — p(i jk)  < a + b  — c < a + b .  <
C o ro lla ry  10: Gross substitutability can be tested by inspecting (”) 2”-2 +3 (”) 2”-3 
inequalities.
6 Final remarks
D efin ition  11: The dual game o f a TU-game v is defined by v* (S) := v ( N ) —v ( N \ S )  
for all S C N .
We conclude with two results, derived from theorem 9:
P rop osition  12: I f  (N,v)  has the GS-property, then:
(i) the game (N, —v *) has the GS-property too,
(ii) the game (N, v + w) has the GS-property i f  (N , w) is a symmetric concave 
game.
Proof: (i) Let i , j , k  be different players outside S  and define S  := N \ ( S  U (ijk)).  By­
using the definition of S  and theorem 9b we get
^ v * ( S U ( i j ) )  ^ v * ( S U ( k ) )  = v ( N \ ( S  U (ij))) +  v ( N \ ( S  U (k))) — 2v(N)
= v(S  U (jfc)) +  v(S  U (ij)) -  2v(N)
< v(S  U (*jfc)) +  v(S  U (j)) -  2v(N)
= v ( N \ ( S  U (j))) +  v ( N \ ( S  U (*jfc))) -  2v(N)
= - v * ( S U ( j ) ) - v * ( S U ( i k ) )
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By interchanging the roles of i and j  and using theorem 9b again we find th a t (N,  —v *) 
has the GS-property.
(ii) The addition of a concave (symmetric) game (N,  w)  does not change the concavity. 
Also the other conditions are not violated, because at both sides of the inequality the 
same number w(s + 2) +  w(s + 1) is added. Here, w(t)  is the coalition value of each 
coalition of size t. <
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